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In the absence of a specialized patent trial court with expertise in 
fact-finding, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit often reviews 
de novo the many factual questions that pervade patent law. De novo re-
view of fact by an appellate court is problematic. In the area of patent 
law, as in other areas of law, there are sound institutional justifications 
for the conventional division of labor that gives trial courts primary re-
sponsibility for questions of law. This Article identifies the problems 
created by de novo appellate review of fact and argues for the creation of 
a specialized trial court to which the Federal Circuit would feel com-
pelled to defer on questions of fact. It also discusses how such a court 
would be designed, focusing on the manner in which trial court judges 
could use the court-appointed advisors to evaluate competing factual 
claims. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
For a number of years, commentators have advocated the creation of a 
specialized patent trial court. They have suggested that a specialized trial 
court could address issues of forum shopping and legal inconsistency at 
the trial court level, just as the 1982 creation of a specialized court of ap-
peals—the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“CAFC” or “Federal 
Circuit”)—addressed these problems at the appellate level.1 These com-
mentators have also argued that a specialized court familiar with the intri-
cacies of patent law and litigation would be much more efficient than the 
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 1. See, e.g., Kimberly A. Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: Does Geo-
graphic Choice Affect Innovation?, 79 N.C. L. REV. 889, 932-33 (2000); John Pegram, 
Should There Be A U.S. Trial Court With a Specialization in Patent Litigation?, 82 J. 
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 766, 790 (2000). 
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current trial courts, which typically undertake a patent trial only once 
every six to eight years.2   
Though these points are important, this essay presents a more funda-
mental structural argument for a specialized trial court. This argument 
emerges from the reality that the complexity of patent law lies not in its 
legal principles but in the scientific fact-finding required to apply those 
legal principles properly. Indeed, difficult questions of scientific fact are 
likely to arise more routinely in patent law than in virtually any other field 
of law.3 Moreover, facts are often central to the ultimate disposition of 
patent cases. Not only is the question of infringement a complicated fac-
tual inquiry, but various other key inquiries, such as those into patent 
scope and patent validity, are also dominated by complex facts.  
Commentators on specialized courts have noted that to the extent a le-
gal field is complex not because of its law but because of its facts, such 
complexity militates in favor of deploying specialized expertise primarily 
at the level of the trial court.4 They have not, however, applied this impor-
tant insight to the field of patents.5 Undertaking such an application is the 
goal of this essay. I begin by discussing the factual foundations of patent 
infringement, scope, and validity. I then turn to the repercussions of hav-
ing these questions decided in the first instance by trial courts that have no 
particular scientific or technological expertise. One major repercussion of 
                                                                                                                         
 2. Moore, supra note 1, at 933; Pegram, supra note 1, at 787-88.  
 3. For purposes of this essay, I assume that even though there is no bright-line 
theoretical division between law and fact, legal determinations, which generally apply 
across many cases, can fruitfully be distinguished from the factual questions specific to a 
particular case. This manner of distinguishing law from fact has implications for how 
thoroughly facts need to be reviewed in the judicial system. See infra Part II.B. The 
law/fact distinction can be seen most clearly if one also acknowledges that there is a third 
category of decisionmaking that involves the application of law to fact. Indeed, many 
questions of patent law, including the questions of claim construction and validity on 
which this article focuses, require this third category of decisionmaking, and thus are best 
seen as mixed questions of law and fact. For an extended discussion of the law/fact dis-
tinction in patent cases, see Arti Rai, Facts, Law, and Policy: An Allocation-of-Powers 
Approach to Patent Reform (Working Paper, 2002) (on file with author).  
 4. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Special-
ized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 74 (1989) (noting that “[w]hen the law is clear but 
difficult to apply to complex factual situations,” expertise is most usefully deployed not 
at the appellate level but at the administrative or trial level); see also Richard Revesz, 
Specialized Courts and the Administrative Lawmaking System, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1111, 
1168-69 (1990) (noting that concerns about the complexity of facts are not reasons for 
creating a specialized appellate court) (emphasis added). 
 5. Even though Rochelle Dreyfuss’ important article addresses patent law, it fo-
cuses on the role of the Federal Circuit in clarifying and making uniform the previously 
inconsistent body of patent law. See generally Dreyfuss, supra note 4. 
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the current system is that the Federal Circuit has taken it upon itself to de-
cide many questions of fact de novo. In some cases it has done so directly, 
by declaring that there can be no dispute as to a particular factual ques-
tion.6 In other cases, it has done so indirectly, by denominating questions 
that have factual foundations—for example, mixed questions of law and 
fact such as claim construction—as pure questions of law. Given the trial 
courts’ lack of familiarity with patent cases, the Federal Circuit’s suspi-
cion of trial court decision-making, even on factual issues, is understand-
able. By the same token the Federal Circuit is not necessarily better 
equipped than the trial court to make factual determinations in any particu-
lar area of science and technology. Only four of the eleven active judges 
on the Federal Circuit are technically trained.7 More importantly, as dis-
cussed below, even if all Federal Circuit judges were technically trained, 
they could hardly be expected to be knowledgeable in the dozens of scien-
tific and technical fields in which patent litigation can arise.8 In addition, it 
is hardly efficient to have an appellate court decide case-specific factual 
questions de novo, after a lower court has already expended time and re-
sources on the same questions. Consequently, in the area of patent law, as 
in other areas of law, there are sound institutional reasons for the conven-
tional division of labor that gives trial courts primary responsibility for 
questions of fact and appellate courts primary responsibility for questions 
of law. 
Establishing a specialized trial court with primary responsibility for 
factual decisions, however, poses challenging questions of institutional 
design. For example, in addressing the general issue of scientific fact-
finding in the court system, some commentators have argued that only 
judges and jurors who actually have training in a particular scientific or 
technical area should be considered epistemically qualified to make fac-
tual findings in that area.9 Although these commentators make a forceful 
point regarding judicial competence, proposals for “two-hat” judges and 
juries would essentially involve creating a patent trial court that replicated 
the highly specialized structure of an administrative agency like the Patent 
and Trademark Office. From a cost-benefit standpoint, this move would be 
                                                                                                                         
 6. See infra Part II.B. 
 7. Judges Gajarsa, Linn, Lourie, and Newman have technical backgrounds. See 
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Judicial Biographies, at 
http://www.fedcir.gov/judgbios.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2002). 
 8. Patents, and patent litigation, span the gamut of the physical and natural sci-
ences, engineering, computer science, and various social sciences. 
 9. See, e.g., Scott Brewer, Scientific Expert Testimony and Intellectual Due Proc-
ess, 107 YALE L.J. 1535 (1998). 
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impractical. The alternative of a specialized trial court that relied heavily 
on court-appointed experts would likely be sufficient for making educated 
factual findings. This level of understanding might be particularly easy to 
achieve if the role of the jury were cabined substantially.10 
It might be argued that, at least to some extent, market forces are al-
ready leading us to the type of specialization that I propose:  judges on 
certain courts, such as the district court of Delaware and the Northern Dis-
trict of California, handle patent cases quite frequently; in general, the ten 
district courts that have the highest number of patent cases hear about 
forty percent of all such cases.11 Moreover, given that we already have a 
specialized appellate court for patents, creating a trial court that focused 
specifically on patents might unduly sacrifice breadth of vision on the altar 
of expertise.  
These criticisms have considerable merit. Nonetheless, they do not un-
dermine the case for a specialized trial court. As matters currently stand, 
more than half of all cases are handled by courts with very little experi-
ence in the type of complicated fact-finding required by patent law. In ad-
dition, the Federal Circuit does not appear to give our semi-specialized 
district courts significantly greater deference than other district courts. A 
single patent trial court that had explicitly been given the imprimatur of 
authority over fact-finding would, in all likelihood, compel greater defer-
ence than the current trial courts. Furthermore, although a single patent 
trial court might be subject to the problems of capture and tunnel vision 
that potentially plague all specialized courts, these problems should have 
less force at the trial level than at the appellate level.  
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part II discusses the factual 
foundations of such key determinations as patent infringement, validity, 
and scope, as well as the manner in which the Federal Circuit has taken to 
reviewing these factual foudnations de novo. It also argues that de novo 
fact-finding by the Federal Circuit should be avoided, for it promotes 
inefficiency as well as substantively bad results. Parts III and IV then 
address some of the difficult questions of institutional design raised by the 
prospect of a specialized trial court. Part III makes the argument for a 
court composed of individuals who would have some exposure to 
scientific methodology but who would rely heavily on court-appointed 
experts.  Part IV discusses the reasons why a single specialized trial court 
                                                                                                                         
 10. The data suggest that because lay juries appear to be significantly less skilled 
than lay judges in making the complex factual determinations central to patent law, their 
role should be substantially reduced, perhaps by invoking some version of a “complex-
ity” exception to the Seventh Amendment. See infra Part III.C. 
 11. See Moore, supra note 1, at 571. 
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IV discusses the reasons why a single specialized trial court would be su-
perior to our current system of semi-specialization.  
II. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S FACT-FINDING 
A. The Role of Facts in Patent Law 
Facts are critical in patent law. Even the Federal Circuit has acknowl-
edged, for example, that patent infringement is a question of fact.12 Facts 
are also central to two other important inquiries in patent law:  the deter-
minations of patent scope and patent validity.  
The scope of a patent—that is, how much territory the patent covers—
is determined through the practice of claim construction.13 Claim construc-
tion begins with the “plain language” of the claim. Notably, however, un-
der both Federal Circuit case law and the most plausible reading of various 
sections of the patent statute, this plain language should be interpreted not 
from the perspective of the ordinary speaker of English but, rather, from 
the vantage point of a “person having ordinary skill in the art” (“PHO-
SITA”).14 The typical judge is unlikely to be a person skilled in the rele-
vant art. Accordingly, after examining the plain language of the claim 
terms using established canons of claim construction,15 she may well find 
                                                                                                                         
 12. See, e.g., Embrex, Inc. v. Serv. Eng’g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1348-49 (Fed. Cir. 
2000). 
 13. See Markman v. Westview Instruments Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 373-74 (1996).  
 14. See, e.g., Multiform Desiccants, Inc. v. Medzam, Ltd., 133 F.3d 1473, 1477 
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (“It is the person of ordinary skill in the field of the invention through 
whose eyes the claims are construed.”); Markman v. Westview Instruments, 52 F.3d 967, 
986 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding that construction of claim term turns on “what one of ordi-
nary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have understood the term to 
mean”). Similarly, sections 103 and 112 of the patent statute, which respectively cover 
the patent validity requirements of nonobviousness and adequate disclosure, turn on the 
vantage point of one of ordinary skill in the art. 35 U.S.C. §§ 103, 112 (1994). In con-
trast, according to textualist theories of statutory interpretation, statutory language is in-
terpreted from the standpoint of the ordinary speaker of English. See, e.g., Green v. Bock 
Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (prescribing the 
interpretation of statutory terms based on “which meaning is . . . most in accord with con-
text and ordinary usage . . . .”). Because of this contrast between claim construction and 
statutory interpretation, even those committed to strict textualism in the context of statu-
tory interpretation should not embrace such textualism in the context of claim construc-
tion. 
 15. The most prominent of these canons involve the relationship between the patent 
claims and the patent specification (i.e., the body of the patent in which the invention is 
described). Under black letter patent law, one may use the specification to help define a 
term or limitation already in a claim. However, one may not read a limitation from the 
specification into a claim. See Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 
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the language opaque. In fact, to the extent the judge does not find the lan-
guage opaque, it may be that she is making unwarranted assumptions 
about how one skilled in the art would interpret the language. 
In most cases involving technically complex invention, the judge 
would be well-advised to turn to the testimony of experts in the relevant 
scientific or technological community (so-called “extrinsic evidence”). 
Indeed, in its 1996 Markman v. Westview Instruments16 decision, the Su-
preme Court explicitly recognized that discerning the meaning of a claim 
term within a trade or profession could be an “evidentiary” investigation.17 
Based on this recognition, the Markman court concluded that claim con-
struction is a “mongrel practice” that “falls somewhere between a pristine 
legal standard and a simple historical fact.”18 
 
Just as claim construction is a fact-dependent inquiry, so too is patent 
validity. The central determinants of patent validity are the inquiries re-
garding nonobviousness and adequate disclosure. Both questions combine 
determinations of law and fact. To satisfy the nonobviousness criterion, 
the patentee must show that, at the time of its invention, the subject matter 
of her patent application would not have been obvious to the PHOSITA.19 
                                                                                                                         
(Fed. Cir. 1996). The specification may prove particularly useful for claim construction 
when the patentee uses it specifically to define a claim term. See Johnson Worldwide 
Associates, Inc. v. Zebco Corp., 175 F.3d 985, 990 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (noting that a pat-
entee may choose to be her own lexicographer by explicitly setting forth a definition for a 
claim term). 
 16. 517 U.S. 370 (1996). 
 17. Id. at 390-91. In some respects, claim construction is analogous to the interpreta-
tion of contractual terms. Courts often look at factual evidence regarding how a particular 
contract term is used in a given trade or industry when determining its meaning. 
 
 18. Id. at 378, 388 (quoting Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985)). To be sure, 
the Supreme Court decision in Markman did choose to assign the task of claim construc-
tion to the judge rather than to the jury. It did so, however, on the basis of largely func-
tional considerations, deciding that such interpretation could best be done by a judge. Id. 
at 378 (“Where history and precedent provide no clear answers, functional considerations 
also play their part in the choice between judge and jury to define terms of art.”).  
 19. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1994). Empirical work by Mark Lemley and John Allison 
indicates that nonobviousness is the most important criterion in determining patent valid-
ity; forty-two percent of patents that are held invalid in litigation are invalidated on 
grounds of nonobviousness. John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on 
the Validity of Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q. J. 185, 208 (1998). Another important 
(and somewhat related) ground for finding patents invalid is lack of novelty under section 
102. Id. (noting that 26.8% of patents are invalidated on grounds of lack of novelty). In 
these cases, the invention is not merely obvious given the prior art, but is actually already 
found in the prior art. As with nonobviousness, facts are central to the novelty determina-
tion. Even the Federal Circuit has recognized this reality. See Rappaport v. Dement, 254 
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As the Supreme Court has emphasized, the nonobviousness inquiry is nec-
essarily based on factual questions regarding the scope and content of the 
prior invention (known as “prior art”) in the field; differences between the 
prior art and the claims at issue; and the level of the ordinary skill in the 
relevant art.20 The secondary considerations that help to prove nonobvi-
ousness, such as the commercial success of an invention or a “long-felt 
need” for the invention, are also factual determinations.21  
Like the nonobviousness inquiry, the inquiry into adequate disclosure 
is grounded in fact. The most important component of adequate disclosure, 
the enablement requirement, requires the patentee to disclose information 
sufficient to allow a person of ordinary skill in the art to make and use the 
patented invention without “undue experimentation.”22 The test for en-
ablement therefore requires the judge to make factual findings regarding 
the level of skill in the art.23  
B. The Federal Circuit’s Alchemy:  Turning Facts into Law  
Ignoring conventional allocation-of-power principles that give trial 
courts primary authority over factual questions, the Federal Circuit has 
asserted power over fact. In the context of claim construction, it has done 
so by simply declaring claim construction to be a pure question of law 
subject to de novo review. The CAFC announced de novo review of claim 
construction in 1995, in its en banc Markman v. Westview Instruments24 
opinion. When the Supreme Court granted certiorari in the Markman case, 
however, it did not endorse de novo review. To the contrary, the Court’s 
observation that claim construction combined both law and fact appeared 
to suggest a more deferential standard of review. In the face of the ambi-
guity caused by the Supreme Court decision, the Federal Circuit explicitly 
                                                                                                                         
F.3d 1053, 1057 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (noting that anticipation, one mechanism for proving 
lack of novelty, is a question of fact). 
 
 20. Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966).  
 21. See, e.g., Specialty Composites v. Cabot Corp., 845 F.2d 981, 991 (Fed. Cir. 
1988).  
 22. In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1561 (Fed. Cir.1993); In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488, 
495-96 (Fed. Cir. 1991). Other less significant components of adequate disclosure include 
the written description requirement and the best mode requirement. Notably, assessing 
compliance with these requirements is considered a determination of fact. See, e.g., Vas-
Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (written description); De-
George v. Bernier, 768 F.2d 1318, 1324-25 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (best mode).  
 23. See PPG Indus., Inc. v. Guardian Indus. Corp., 75 F.3d 1558, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 
1996) (observing that enablement is a question of law based on underlying factual find-
ings).  
 24. 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc).  
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affirmed its commitment to de novo review two years later, in another en 
banc decision, Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies.25  
The court has been quite aggressive in its application of de novo re-
view. Two recent empirical studies estimate that the Federal Circuit has 
disagreed with lower court claim construction in at least one-third of all 
appealed cases.26 Notably, the Federal Circuit’s plenary review of claim 
construction can have something of a domino effect, leading the court to 
arrogate power over issues even it admits are factual, such as infringe-
ment.  
This domino effect works as follows:  because claim construction 
bears heavily on the question of infringement, a decision to overturn the 
district court’s claim construction often means that a new determination 
regarding infringement must be made. At that point, the Federal Circuit 
faces two choices. It can either remand to the district court for cumber-
some new fact-finding on the question of infringement, or it can simply 
determine the question of infringement itself. Even though infringement 
is, under the Federal Circuit’s own jurisprudence, a factual issue,27 the 
Federal Circuit is often reluctant to remand for a new trial on infringe-
ment. Rather, the court simply declares that there is no factual dispute with 
respect to infringement. As a consequence, de novo review of claim con-
struction effectively becomes de novo review of infringement.   
                                                                                                                         
 25. 138 F.3d 1448 (1998). 
 26. See Christian Chu, Empirical Analysis of the Federal Circuit’s Claim Construc-
tion Trends, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1075, 1104 (2001) (giving figure of 44%); Kim-
berly A. Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped to Resolve Patent Cases?, 15 HARV. 
J.L. TECH. 1, 11 (2001) (giving figure of 33%). The discrepancy between the Moore and 
Chu findings likely emerges from two factors. First, while Moore’s study encompasses 
cases decided between April 1996 and December 2000, Chu’s study encompasses cases 
decided between January 1998 and April 2000. In addition, while Moore’s includes 
within her population of cases Rule 36 summary affirmances, Chu excludes these affir-
mances. Chu’s study also draws interesting conclusions regarding the Federal Circuit's 
review of patent cases more generally. He determines that, excluding summary affir-
mances, the overall reversal rate was 47.3%. Id. at 1098. Including summary affirmances, 
the overall reversal rate was 36.6%. Id. at 1100. 
 27. See supra note 12. Both infringement and infringement under the doctrine of 
equivalents are factual issues. See Hilton Davis Chemical Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 
62 F.3d 1512, 1520-21 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (citing Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. 
Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 609-10 (1950), for the proposition that a finding of 
equivalence is a question of fact). The equivalence inquiry requires the fact-finder to de-
termine whether the allegedly infringing invention performs the same function in the 
same way to achieve the same result as the patented invention. This so-called function-
way-result equivalence can result in a finding of infringement even when the accused 
invention does not literally infringe the claims of the relevant patent. See generally 
Graver Tank, 339 U.S. 605. 
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For example, in Pall Corporation v. Hemasure, Inc.,28 the patentee 
claimed that the defendant had infringed its patent on a system that filtered 
leukocytes (white blood cells) from blood. The district court broadly con-
strued the disputed claim language, which referred to a “gas outlet com-
prising a porous medium.” Based on that broad construction, the trial court 
found literal infringement.29 On appeal, the Federal Circuit substituted a 
narrower interpretation, stating that given the description in the specifica-
tion, the porous medium actually had to be placed at the outlet of the sys-
tem.30 Relying on this narrower construction, the Federal Circuit held that 
there could be no dispute that the defendant’s device escaped infringe-
ment, not only literally but also under the doctrine of equivalents.31 The 
court entered a judgment for the defendant.32  
In contrast to its stance on claim construction, the Federal Circuit has 
not declared validity determinations like nonobviousness and enablement 
to be pure questions of law. Rather, the court has focused exclusively on 
the legal component of nonobviousness and has argued that de novo re-
view should apply to all components of the nonobviousness determination, 
whether made by a trial judge or a jury. Soon after the Federal Circuit’s 
creation, its propensity for de novo review became evident. In Dennison 
Manufacturing Co. v. Panduit Corp.,33 the Supreme Court responded to an 
appellant’s complaint that the Federal Circuit was exercising plenary 
power over the nonobviousness determination by asking the CAFC to ex-
plain the standard of review it applied to trial court findings regarding 
nonobviousness. On remand, the Federal Circuit dutifully discussed at 
some length the factual foundations of nonobviousness.34 Despite this ac-
knowledgement, various judges on the Federal Circuit have continued to 
assert plenary power over nonobviousness. For example, in Newell Com-
panies, Inc. v. Kenney Mfg. Co.,35 a case decided only a year after the re-
mand in Dennison, the majority simply announced that there was no fac-
                                                                                                                         
 28. 181 F.3d 1305, 1307 (1999).     
 29. Id. at 1310. 
 30. Id. 
 31. For a discussion of the doctrine of equivalents, see supra note 27. 
 32. In a recent article, William Rooklidge and Matthew Weil point to Pall Corpora-
tion and similar cases in which the Federal Circuit has reviewed infringement determina-
tions de novo. See William C. Rooklidge and Matthew Weil, Judicial Hyperactivity: The 
Federal Circuit’s Discomfort With Its Appellate Role, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 725 
(2000). They do not, however, note the connection between the court’s de novo claim 
construction and its de novo review of infringement. 
 33. 475 U.S. 809 (1985). 
 34. 810 F.2d 1561, 1566 (1987). 
 35. 864 F.2d 757, 762-65 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
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tual dispute with respect to nonobviousness and that it could therefore re-
view the jury’s determination of nonobviousness de novo. The majority 
declared that there was no issue of fact even though one of the patentee’s 
main arguments, which the court rejected, was a factual assertion regard-
ing the differences between a particular prior art patent and his own pat-
ent.36  
Similarly, in important cases involving the enablement requirement, 
the court has paid mere lip service to principles of deferential review. In 
Northern Telecom, Inc. v. Datapoint Corporation,37 a case involving 
claims to a method for entering, verifying, and storing data using a batch 
data entry terminal, the CAFC faced a decision by the lower court finding 
that the method claims in question were not enabled. The district court had 
concluded that, because the patentee had not provided any details regard-
ing the data entry program in question, undue experimentation would be 
required to write the program.38 The Federal Circuit noted that the amount 
of disclosure required to enable a software-based invention generally var-
ies depending on the facts of the particular case. These facts might include 
“the nature of the invention, the role of the program in carrying it out, and 
the complexity of the contemplated programming, all from the viewpoint 
of the skilled programmer.”39 The CAFC also acknowledged that a num-
ber of expert witnesses had testified that further detail regarding the pro-
gram would indeed have been useful “in order to avoid spending experi-
mental time.”40 The Federal Circuit even noted that the district court’s de-
termination regarding undue experimentation should be overturned only 
for clear error.41 Nonetheless, the appellate court reversed the trial court’s 
enablement finding. The Northern Telecom decision is particularly perni-
cious because the Federal Circuit now appears to have elevated to the level 
of law the idea that very little disclosure is necessary to enable computer 
software, irrespective of the nature and complexity of the software in-
volved.42  
                                                                                                                         
 36. Id. at 768 (rejecting patentee’s argument that the prior art taught away from a 
do-it-yourself adjustable shade). Dissenting in that case, Judge Newman attacked the 
panel majority for baldly asserting that the facts were undisputed on appeal. Id. at 773 
(Newman, J., dissenting).  
 37. 908 F.2d 931, 933 (Fed. Cir. 1990).  
 38. Id. at 943. 
 39. Id. at 941. 
 40. Id. at 942 (noting testimony of expert witness). 
 41. Id. at 943. 
 42. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Biotechnology’s Uncertainty Principle 
(Working Paper) (on file with author) (noting that “the Federal Circuit has articulated 
very loose, almost trivial standards for disclosure of computer software”).  
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C. Why De Novo Review of Fact is a Bad Idea 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure give trial courts primary respon-
sibility for fact finding.43 The central normative justification for this as-
signment of responsibility turns on the need to conserve scarce judicial 
resources.44 If the appellate court attempted to acquire the district court’s 
knowledge of any given factual setting (whether through careful review of 
the documentary record or by calling witnesses itself), that acquisition 
would come at great expense.45 Relative to that expense, the benefits of 
having another fact-finder are, in the vast majority of cases, likely to be 
small.46 Moreover, unlike de novo review of legal principles, de novo re-
view of facts is typically not essential for the appellate court to perform its 
primary task—maintaining the uniformity of the law as a whole. This is 
particularly true in patent cases, where the facts in question are typically 
“adjudicative,” or case-specific, facts. Factual disputes in patent cases 
generally turn on how a particular patented invention relates either to an 
allegedly infringing invention or to the state of technical knowledge in a 
field at a given time.47 Because it is unlikely that such facts will be rele-
vant in future cases, exacting review of these facts, even in cases where 
they largely determine the answer to a legal question, is not necessary for 
maintaining legal uniformity.48 Indeed, to the extent that the Federal Cir-
                                                                                                                         
 43. FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a). 
 44. In cases where the jury acts as the fact-finder, it could also be argued that re-
spect for the jury’s fact-finding role under the Seventh Amendment requires appellate 
deference.  
 45. Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 560 (1988).  
 46. Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564, 574-75 (1985) (“Duplication of 
the trial judge’s efforts in the court of appeals would very likely contribute only negligi-
bly to the accuracy of fact determination at a huge cost in diversion of judicial re-
sources.”). De novo review may be justified when the facts in question are not specific to 
the particular case but are likely to be relevant to many different cases. See note 48 infra.  
 47. The relevant point in time may be the time the invention was made or the time 
that the patent application was filed. 
 48. Adjudicative facts may usefully be contrasted with “legislative” facts—that is, 
general facts about the world that may be relevant in a wide variety of cases. Because of 
their widespread application, legislative facts may be reviewed under a de novo standard. 
Although some scientific principles are analogous to legislative facts in that they tran-
scend a particular dispute, the facts most relevant to patent cases are almost never tran-
scendent scientific principles. See David Faigman et al., Check Your Crystal Ball at the 
Courthouse Door, Please: Exploring the Past, Understanding the Present, and Worrying 
About the Future of Scientific Evidence, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1799, 1821 (1994) (argu-
ing that scientific information that transcends a particular dispute is like a legislative fact 
and should be reviewed de novo). Rather than turning on timeless scientific principles, 
patent cases usually turn on far more mundane inquiries regarding how a given invention 
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cuit gives particular facts—for example, the level of the ordinary skill in 
art at a particular point in time—precedential, or “law-like” value, it 
commits the serious error of assuming skill in the art is static. 
It may be argued that because the CAFC is a specialized court, with 
expertise superior to that of the trial courts, the cost-benefit analysis that 
underlies the traditional allocation of power between trial and appellate 
court should not apply. However, the expertise enjoyed by the Federal 
Circuit rests in the area of patent law, not in the factual particulars of any 
given technology. Only four of the eleven active judges on the Federal 
Circuit have technical training.49 More importantly, even those who are 
technically trained are unlikely to have expertise in the area of science or 
technology raised by any given patent case. Indeed, as discussed further in 
Part II infra, it is difficult to imagine the creation of a court that would 
have even one judge, let alone a group of judges, trained in all of the vari-
ous different areas of science and technology to which the patent system 
applies. Accordingly, it should not be surprising that a number of Federal 
Circuit cases provide grounds for questioning the court’s de novo review 
of trial court fact-finding. For example, in cases involving computer soft-
ware,50 the CAFC’s tendency to believe that any and all software pro-
grams can be enabled without disclosure of source code, flow charts, or 
other detail has led it to overturn enablement findings by lower courts that 
paid more careful attention to expert testimony addressing the particulars 
of the case. 
To be sure, there is also reason to question whether the lay judges and 
jurors who serve on generalist trial courts do a thorough job of fact-finding 
in technically challenging cases. Indeed, a significant analytical and em-
pirical literature—discussed further in Part III infra—suggests that lay 
persons, faced with competing expert accounts of a scientific or techno-
                                                                                                                         
relates to other inventions or to the state of technical knowledge in a particular field at a 
given point in time.  
  The major context in which facts found in a particular patent case might have 
relevance for future cases, such that deferential review might lead to lack of uniformity, 
would be where the same patent was asserted against different parties in different cases. 
In such a situation, two different trial courts might, based on different factual findings, 
reach different conclusions on validity or claim construction. If the appellate court were 
to defer to the factual findings of the trial court in each case, it might not be able to rec-
oncile the trial court holdings. These situations should arise relatively rarely, however. 
Moreover, at least in cases where the earlier trial court holding found against the patentee 
on the relevant issue or issues, defensive issue preclusion would control the issue in the 
later case. 
 49. See supra note 7. 
 50. See supra notes 37-41. 
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logical dispute, are unlikely to make considered judgments. The solution, 
however, is not to set up the CAFC as a trial court. Rather, it is to bolster 
the expertise of the trial courts in deciding questions of fact.  
III. INSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES IN SETTING UP A 
SPECIALIZED TRIAL COURT 
So how should we set up a specialized patent trial court? We can re-
ceive some guidance from the substantial literature outside the patent field 
on how trial courts should address cases involving scientifically challeng-
ing facts. This literature has grown in volume since the 1993 Supreme 
Court opinion in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,51 which 
interpreted key provisions of the Federal Rules of Evidence concerning the 
admissibility of scientific expert testimony. In Daubert, the Supreme 
Court responded to fears about “junk science” undermining the accuracy 
and fairness of judicial decisionmaking by mandating that judges take a 
much more aggressive role in evaluating expert scientific and technical 
testimony. 
Under Daubert, judges should admit proffered scientific evidence for 
evaluation by the fact-finder (whether the jury or the judge herself) only 
when the evidence is scientifically valid—that is, “ground[ed] in the 
methods and procedures of science”52 and “derived by the scientific 
method.”53 The Daubert analysis offers four questions that a trial court 
should consider in determining scientific validity:  1) is the expert’s 
method or technique testable or falsifiable; 2) has the method been sub-
jected to peer review and publication; 3) does the method have a high 
known or potential error rate; and 4) is the method generally accepted in 
the scientific community.54 Although these factors provide a framework 
                                                                                                                         
 51. 504 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 52. Id. at 590. 
 53. Id. The Daubert Court’s discussion of scientific knowledge relied on Webster’s 
dictionary and two amicus briefs, one by a group of scientists, the other by the American 
Association for the Advancement of Science and the National Academy of Sciences. The 
Court observed that science “represents a process for proposing and refining theoretical 
explanations about the world that are subject to further testing and refinement.” Id.  
 54. Id. at 593-94. Federal Rule of Evidence 702 has recently been amended in a 
manner that largely conforms to the prescriptions of the Daubert test. Rule 702 states:  
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the 
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a 
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, 
or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, 
if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient reliable facts or data (2) the 
testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods and (3) the 
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by which an admissibility determination may be made, none is either nec-
essary or sufficient. By contrast, under the prior rule, enunciated in the 
1923 case Frye v. United States,55 the judge’s role had been much more 
passive:  the necessary and sufficient criterion for admissibility of scien-
tific testimony had simply been “general acceptance in the particular field 
to which it belongs.”56   
The Supreme Court has also made it clear that it considers the scope of 
Daubert to be quite wide. Specifically, in the 1999 case Kumho Tire Co. v. 
Carmichael,57 the Court held that the Daubert factors apply not simply to 
the type of scientific testimony traditionally offered in courtrooms (for ex-
ample, testimony on forensic science or epidemiology) but also to all ex-
pert testimony based on specialized knowledge. As a consequence, trial 
courts have begun to entertain Daubert challenges in patent cases. For ex-
ample, when experts offer testimony on such factual issues as infringe-
ment or the factual foundations of nonobviousness and claim construction, 
their testimony can be subject to a Daubert challenge.58 
The exacting requirements that Daubert and its progeny impose on lay 
judges have been the subject of considerable controversy. Judge Kozinski 
of the Ninth Circuit, who authored the opinion upon remand from the Su-
preme Court in Daubert, pointedly noted that “[a]s we read the Supreme 
Court’s teaching in Daubert, therefore, though we are largely untrained in 
science and certainly no match for any of the witnesses whose testimony 
we are reviewing, it is our responsibility to determine whether those ex-
perts’ proposed testimony amounts to ‘scientific knowledge,’ constitutes 
‘good science,’ and was ‘derived by the scientific method.’”59 More gen-
erally, scholars have questioned the extent to which judges can understand 
and properly apply the Daubert criteria. Scholars have pointed out, for ex-
ample, that Daubert provides almost no guidance on how the decision-
making guideline of falsifiability should be applied or on how the error 
                                                                                                                         
witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of 
the case.  
FED. R. EVID. 702. 
 55. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).  
 56. Id. at 1014. 
 57. 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999). 
 58. See, e.g., Carnegie Mellon Univ. v. Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., 55 F. Supp. 2d 
1024 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (excluding expert testimony on infringement based on a Daubert 
challenge).  
 59. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms. Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1316 (9th Cir. 1995). 
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rate of a particular scientific technique should be determined.60 In addi-
tion, recent empirical evidence suggests that the majority of judges (at 
least state court trial judges) have difficulty understanding such basic 
Daubert concepts as falsifiability and error rate.61  
If cases are to be decided correctly, however, the challenges posed to 
trial courts by scientific and technical evidence extend far beyond thresh-
old admissibility questions. Indeed, these challenges must be addressed 
squarely no matter what the threshold test for admissibility. Even if tech-
nical evidence is sufficiently reliable so as to be admissible, it may none-
theless be inferior to other, conflicting evidence. A lay judge or juror is 
likely to have difficulty adjudicating between competing factual claims of 
opposing experts, particularly when each expert, ex hypothesi, employs a 
methodology sufficient to surmount the Daubert bar.62 When lay individu-
als are dealing with technically challenging questions, the usual mecha-
nisms by which they decide whether or not to give weight to particular 
testimony—for example, its internal consistency or the demeanor of the 
witness who is giving the testimony—simply do not carry much weight.63 
Even according deference based on the relative credentials of the compet-
                                                                                                                         
 60. See, e.g., Sophia Gatowski et al., Asking the Gatekeepers: A National Survey of 
Judges on Judging Expert Evidence in a Post-Daubert World, 25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 
433, 437 (2001).  
 61. The Gatowski survey of state trial judges indicates that, although judges gener-
ally support the gatekeeping role defined by Daubert, they do not appear to understand 
the test particularly well. Only five percent of the respondents demonstrated a clear un-
derstanding of the falsifiability concept and only four percent demonstrated a clear under-
standing of the error rate concept. Id. at 433. 
 62. Scott Brewer notes the strange result that emerges from use of the Daubert bar: 
When the evidence is so weak that no reputable scientist in the field 
would endorse it, prevent the nonexpert from hearing it (and from hear-
ing that no reputable expert would endorse it); but when the best scien-
tific theories and methods underdetermine the result, let the nonexpert 
decide who is correct. 
Brewer, supra note 9, at 1600.  
 63. See id. at 1619-25. As David Faigman explains in regard to the usefulness of 
demeanor:  
Good scientific research simply does not depend on the credibility of 
individual witnesses. If the question is whether the declarant made a 
statement under a belief of impending death, the nurse’s credibility 
might be critical. . . . In contrast, whether a series of six epidemiologi-
cal studies supports the conclusion that the relative risk associated with 
silicone implants exceeds 2.0 for connective tissue disorder does not 
entail the same sort of credibility assessment. 
David L. Faigman, Appellate Review of Scientific Evidence Under Daubert and Joiner, 48 
HASTINGS L.J. 969, 978-79 (1997). 
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ing witnesses assumes that the layperson is competent to judge which cre-
dentials are most relevant as a basis for weighing the persuasiveness of 
testimony in a given field.64 More importantly, credentials do not substi-
tute for the type of substantive evaluation that should be required in any 
judicial process that adheres to a minimal standard of fairness and accu-
racy.  
In order to assist lay judges and juries in deciding cases involving 
complicated factual issues, scholars of the court system have suggested 
that the trial court can avail itself of a wide range of expert help. For ex-
ample, Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion in the 1997 case General Elec-
tric Company v. Joiner65 notes that special masters and specially trained 
law clerks can assist the court in technically complicated cases.66 Judges 
can also use their inherent power to appoint technical advisors who can 
serve as specialized law clerks. Finally, judges can invoke Rule 706 of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence and appoint their own expert witnesses. 
One might challenge liberal use of third-party expertise on the grounds 
that such assistance gives the adversarial judicial process an inquisitorial 
cast. In technically complex cases involving conflicting expert testimony, 
however, reducing the adversarial component may be a virtue rather than a 
vice. “Battles of the experts” in which the parties present well-credentialed 
individuals making opposing claims are likely to shed more heat than 
light. In addition, careful limitations on the roles played by third-party ex-
perts can prevent cases from being removed from the control of the par-
ties. Consider, for example, the situation in which the court appoints an 
expert to act as a technical advisor. Because technical advisors work out-
side the scrutiny of the parties, and may not be deposed or called to testify, 
trial courts have tended to limit the advisor's role to providing the court 
with a general tutorial on the relevant science and technology. Courts have 
avoided using technical advisors for direct opinions on the merits of the 
parties’ testimony.67  
In contrast, the Rule 706 expert witness may be deposed, called to tes-
tify, and cross-examined by the parties.68 The expert witness must also 
make her findings available to the parties. Similarly, the court must make 
its own instructions to the expert witness available to the parties. As a con-
                                                                                                                         
 64. Brewer, supra note 9, at 1624-34. 
 65. 522 U.S. 136 (1997). 
 66. Id. at 149-50.  
 67. See, e.g., MediaCom Corp. v. Rates Tech., Inc., 4 F. Supp. 2d 17, 30 n.11 (D. 
Mass. 1998) (noting that technical advisor appointed in case would play an educational 
role and would not be used for fact-finding). 
 68. FED. R. EVID. 706(a). 
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sequence of this greater transparency, it becomes appropriate for expert 
witnesses to offer opinions on the parties’ testimony. Indeed, according to 
Federal Judicial Center survey data, courts have appointed expert wit-
nesses to assist in resolving conflicting expert testimony.69    
A contentious issue raised by the use of third-party expertise, particu-
larly the use of Rule 706 experts, involves who should participate in the 
appointment process. Allowing the parties to the case to be involved may 
increase the expert’s legitimacy. By the same token, each of the parties 
will no doubt lobby for the individual who is most allied with their inter-
ests. The choice of the expert is particularly important in cases where the 
scientific or technical dispute is prominent and heated. In areas of heated 
scientific controversy, all individuals who are sufficiently knowledgeable 
to qualify as experts may have already committed themselves to one or the 
other side of a dispute. 
 
More generally, even in cases where the relevant scientific disputes are 
not as heated, judges must make difficult choices about which experts to 
appoint. An intelligent choice of expert requires, however, that the judge 
has some ability to evaluate the expert’s work. To the extent that evaluat-
ing the expert’s work requires an understanding of the relevant science 
and technology in the first instance, suggestions that trial courts rely on 
court-appointed experts may beg the question rather than address it.   
In lieu of using court-appointed experts, Scott Brewer suggests that we 
have scientifically or technically trained judges and juries in cases where 
scientific or technical facts are at issue.70 Brewer’s proposal for a “two-
hat” solution is important and provocative. By showing us what strict ad-
herence to an ideal of judicial competence in technically complicated 
cases might require, Brewer demonstrates how far we have to travel. A 
host of practical difficulties attends his proposed solution, however. First, 
because expertise in one area of science or technology does not transfer 
over to other areas,71 Brewer’s proposal would require selecting a group of 
                                                                                                                         
 69. Si-Hung Choy, Comment, Judicial Education After Markman v. Westview In-
struments, Inc.: The Use of Court-Appointed Experts, 47 UCLA L. Rev. 1423, 1428 
(2000) (citing results from Federal Judicial Center survey). Court-appointed expert wit-
nesses tend to be used relatively infrequently, however. The Federal Judicial Center sur-
vey of federal trial court judges found that only twenty percent had appointed experts. 
The assumption appears to be that experts should be appointed only in unusual circum-
stances. See id. at 1445.  
 70. Brewer, supra note 9, at 1677-79. 
 71. See Jay P. Kesan, Carrots and Sticks to Create a Better Patent System, 17 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 763 (2002) (discussing highly localized nature of scientific knowl-
edge). To the contrary, expertise in one area of science may be problematic in that it leads 
the judge to view all other areas through the lens of that science. To be sure, general ex-
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judges that was trained in a large variety of different areas of science and 
technology. In the patent context, this would presumably mean a trial 
court with at least as many specialties and subspecialties as the Patent and 
Trademark Office. But setting up a judicial process that is merely a higher 
cost version of the administrative process is unlikely to produce benefits 
that justify its cost. In any event, the likelihood of assembling a group of 
judges competent not only in law but in all of the various fields of scien-
tific and technical endeavor relevant to the patent system is low. More-
over, to the extent that a specialized trial court incorporated juries (an is-
sue discussed below), Brewer’s proposal would require assembling a pool 
of jurors competent in the technical area relevant to that case. Assembling 
such a pool for every patent case would, at a minimum, be quite costly. 
In contrast with Brewer’s “two-hat” proposal, setting up a specialized 
trial court with lay judges who had basic training in the scientific method, 
and who were given sufficient resources to appoint experts liberally, 
would be feasible and cost-effective. To be sure, the question of how these 
court-appointed experts would be appointed would still be with us. As was 
noted earlier, lay judges do not have the training to evaluate directly the 
work of potential experts. In all likelihood, the rough proxy of credentials 
would have to serve as the relevant criterion.  
Credentials are not particularly good criteria on which to ground the 
substantive first-order choice between opposing scientific claims. How-
ever, credentials may provide a reasonable (if far from perfect) foundation 
for the second-order decision regarding the individual to whom the first-
order choice should be given. Relying on particular credentials to make 
the second-order decision is qualitatively different from relying on these 
credentials to make the first-order decision. To the extent that credentials 
are used to ground the first-order decision, the judicial process does not at 
any point encompass a substantive evaluation of the merits of particular 
claims. In contrast, when credentials are used in the second-order decision, 
the first-order decision is still based on substantive criteria.  
A brief observation regarding the role of juries bears mention.72 Con-
siderable evidence, both anecdotal and statistical, suggests that juries are 
particularly poor arbiters of complex scientific fact. As an anecdotal mat-
ter, patent lawyers have long observed that juries tend unduly to favor the 
                                                                                                                         
posure to the scientific method will be useful. General exposure to the scientific method 
can be achieved, however, through a basic course in research methodology. As discussed 
further infra, this basic course could be required of lay judges on a specialized trial court. 
 72. The role of juries is discussed more fully in Rai, supra note 3. 
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patentee.73 Similarly, Kimberly Moore’s empirical study of all trial court 
cases that were resolved by a fact-finder between 1983 and 1999 indicates 
that juries are far more likely than judges to rule for the patentee—while 
judges rule for patentees in fifty-one percent of cases brought by the pat-
entee, juries rule for patentees in sixty-eight percent of such cases.74 The 
patentee-win rate before juries is particularly striking to the extent that de-
fendants can be presumed to have incorporated information about pro-
patentee jury bias into their decision about whether to take the case to trial 
before a jury in the first instance. In other words, it may be that defendants 
are bringing only their strongest cases to trial before a jury but still manag-
ing to lose two-thirds of the time. Because juries are highly suspect as 
finders of scientific fact, it is probably a good idea to cabin their role, per-
haps by invoking some version of the complexity exception to the Seventh 
Amendment.75 
IV. ARGUMENTS AGAINST A SPECIALIZED TRIAL COURT 
It could be argued that we already have a semi-specialized version of 
the patent trial court system proposed here. Under our current system, al-
most half of all patent cases are filed in about ten district courts.76 More-
over, to the extent that these district courts do not already make routine 
use of court-appointed expert witnesses, they could certainly be given the 
resources to make liberal use of such witnesses.   
This argument, however, ignores the reality that the majority of cases 
still go to inexperienced courts. Moreover, even if the percentage of cases 
filed with inexperienced courts were to decrease somewhat, it would 
probably be far from zero—when parties can choose between tribunals 
with expertise and those without, at least some parties with weak cases 
will gamble on nonexpert tribunals. In addition, a system that contains 
both expert and nonexpert tribunals in a given area cannot realize fully the 
efficiencies that emerge from division of labor. 
The current system is also problematic in that the Federal Circuit does 
not give fact-finding by experienced district courts substantially greater 
                                                                                                                         
 73. Allan L. Littman, The Jury’s Role in Determining Key Issues in Patent Cases: 
Markman, Hilton-Davis, and Beyond, 37 IDEA 207, 209 (1997). 
 74. Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases: An Empirical Peek In-
side the Black Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365, 386 (2000). 
 75. Use of the complexity exception would not mean that juries would be altogether 
excluded from the patent. They could be used to determine issues like inequitable con-
duct and willful infringement, where assessments of credibility and character may play a 
role. 
 76. See supra note 11. 
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weight than fact-finding by inexperienced ones. Data presented in a recent 
study by Christian Chu indicate that, although there is some difference in 
reversal rates between “more active” patent tribunals and “less active” 
ones, this difference is not statistically significant.77 In contrast to our cur-
rent system of semi-specialization, a specialized trial court would have the 
imprimatur of authority with respect to fact-finding. This added authority 
would presumably add to the deference given it by the Federal Circuit. 
One might also worry about creating too much specialization within 
the patent system. Specifically, given that we already have a specialized 
appellate court for patents, the creation of another specialized court raises 
concerns about narrowness of judicial vision and possible capture.78 These 
concerns are important ones. However, while concern about excessive 
specialization might call for reform at the level of the Federal Circuit,79 it 
does not necessarily militate against the creation of a specialized court. 
Problems of tunnel vision and bias are likely to have much greater impor-
tance at the level of the appellate court than at the level of trial court. 
While trial courts decide facts in individual cases, appellate courts have 
the responsibility for developing the law. With respect to trial courts, the 
balance between expertise and vision should probably be struck in favor of 
expertise. In contrast, at the level of the appellate court, we should proba-
bly err on the side of broad vision. The need for balance and breadth in 
appellate decisionmaking is particularly acute in an area as infused by 
economic analysis, and as central to innovation and competition policy, as 
patent law. 
                                                                                                                         
 77. Chu, supra note 26, at 1121-27. As noted earlier, Chu analyzed patent decisions 
rendered by the Federal Circuit between January 1, 1998 and April 30, 2000. The cate-
gory of more active tribunals included those district courts from which the Federal Cir-
cuit reviewed more than ten cases during the studied period. The more active group also 
included tribunals with specialized jurisdiction that includes patents, such as the Board of 
Patent Appeals and Interferences, the Court of Federal Claims, and the International 
Trade Commission. Id. at 1122. Chu found that, within his studied population, the Fed-
eral Circuit tended to reverse more cases from less active tribunals than from more active 
ones (41% vs. 34% respectively). This tendency was not sufficiently marked, however, to 
have predictive implications for future cases. 
 78. For general discussions of such concerns, see, e.g., Harold Bruff, Specialized 
Courts in Administrative Law, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 329, 331 (1991), Revesz, supra note 4, 
at 1120 (1990). 
 79. Several different mechanisms through which generalist judges could play a role 
at the appellate level are outlined in Rai, supra note 3. 
 63(&,$/,=(’75,$/&28576  
 
V. CONCLUSION 
Proposals for reform of the patent system must confront the reality that 
patent law is suffused with complicated findings of scientific fact. Ad-
dressing this reality probably requires the creation of a specialized trial 
court with some level of expertise in scientific fact-finding. This expertise 
does not, however, have to come directly from the judges themselves. The 
more practical alternative of a system in which specialized trial court 
judges are provided with the resources to appoint expert consultants in 
many, if not most, cases is likely to produce decisions that comport with 
standards of intellectual due process.  
